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1 Introduction
We consider a simple equilibrium model of unemployment and sectoral reallocation to explore
how the composition of mobile versus immobile workers affects unemployment. The issue is
important because sectoral mobility differs considerably across individuals and the relative
share of more mobile versus less mobile workers shifts over time. For example, according
to Moscarini and Thomsson (2007), an individual’s age is negatively correlated with his
occupational and industrial mobility. Thus, it seems natural to ask whether the aging of the
labor force has an impact on the labor market outcomes of both young and old workers. One
can also ask a similar question in the context of geographical mobility, as migration is much
lower among older workers (e.g., Topel (1986) and Greenwood (1997)). Another issue, which
is more related to the recent experiences of the U.S., concerns the collapse of the housing
market. Specifically, there is a valid concern as to whether an increase in the number of
homeowners trapped in their homes by negative home equity has had an adverse impact on
the aggregate labor market.1
We start with the two-sector equilibrium model of Rogerson (1987), which in turn builds
on Lucas and Prescott (1974). His model has the following features that are important for
the purpose of the current paper. First, the marginal productivity of labor is decreasing at the
sectoral level and shifts with sector-specific shocks. Second, a worker can move across sectors
for a better job opportunity. We augment these features with the following three elements.
First, within each sector, firms and workers meet through competitive search (e.g., Moen,
1997 and Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005).2 Second, in addition to the sector-specific
shock common to workers within the same sector, there is also an idiosyncratic shock specific
to the sector-worker match as in Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990). Third, the cost of moving
between the two sectors differs across workers. In particular, some workers can move across
sectors costlessly, while the others are immobile.
Because of the idiosyncratic productivity shock, a worker may move from one sector to
another, even if labor market conditions are the same between the two sectors. Consequently,
in the model, a sector can experience a simultaneous inflow and outflow of workers. Below,
for brevity, these simultaneous in- and outflows driven by the idiosyncratic productivity
shock will be referred to as gross mobility, while labor mobility driven by a sector-specific
1For studies examining the relationship between homeownership and unemployment, see, for example,
Oswald (1997, 1999); Munch, Rosholm and Svarer (2006); Coulson and Fisher (2009); Head and Lloyd-Ellis
(2012) and Valletta (2012).
2The interaction of within-sector trading frictions and sectoral mobility is also considered in other studies.
For example, Lkhagvasuren (2007, 2012) uses a similar multi-sector setting to analyze local labor market
dynamics in the U.S. Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013) develop an equilibrium multi-sector model with
within-sector trading frictions to study the cyclicality of sectoral reallocation.
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shock will be referred to as net mobility.
The model shows that net mobility driven by a sector-specific shock lowers productivity
differences between sectors while reducing unemployment differences across sectors. More
important, in the presence of such net mobility, the share of mobile workers can have a non-
monotonic, but globally negative impact on the unemployment rate of immobile workers. The
results also show that the combination of gross mobility and firm-worker trading frictions
introduces a novel equilibrium effect from having mobile workers. Specifically, when labor
mobility is driven by a sector-worker match effect, the share of mobile workers raises overall
productivity of workers within each sector. While such an overall increase in productivity
raises employment within each sector, it raises the unemployment rate among immobile
workers due to the decreasing returns to scale at the sectoral level. So, the equilibrium effect
of heterogeneous moving costs differs depending on how mobility is modeled. The model
also shows that, regardless of whether sectoral mobility is modeled as net or gross mobility,
aggregate unemployment and the share of mobile workers are negatively related.3
These results suggest that ignoring gross mobility or match-specific effects can lead to an
erroneous conclusion that the share of mobile workers lowers the unemployment of the rest
of the workers, while its true effect can be the opposite. Moreover, judging a multi-sector
model by its predictions on aggregate variables might introduce an important oversight
regarding the underlying economic mechanisms. Therefore, the micro-level relationship be-
tween mobility and productivity are important for understanding the impact of mobility on
unemployment.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 constructs a simple equilibrium
model of sectoral mobility and unemployment while allowing for both net and gross mobility.
Section 3 considers a special case of the model in which there is only net mobility. Section 4
considers a version of the model in which each sector can experience a simultaneous inflow
and outflow without net mobility. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
The economy consists of two sectors indexed by j ∈ {0, 1}. Each of these sectors is initially
populated by a unit measure of workers. There is also a continuum of firms in each sector.
A worker can be employed or unemployed. Being employed means being matched with a
3This is consistent with the procyclicality of mobility studied by Moscarini and Thomsson (2007),
Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), Lkhagvasuren (2012) and Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013).
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firm. Firms look for workers by creating vacancies. Unemployed workers and vacancies
meet according to a matching technology. Each sector is subject to a shock that affects the
output of all firms operating in that sector. Let z0 and z1 denote these shocks to sectors 0
and 1, respectively. Moreover, workers in the same sector can differ by their idiosyncratic
productivity shock x.
The economy lasts only one period, but it unfolds in four stages. At the beginning
of the economy, all workers are unemployed. In the second stage, workers observe their
idiosyncratic productivity shock, x, and the sector-specific shocks, z0 and z1. Given these
shocks, workers decide whether they should stay in their current sector and look for a job or
move to the other sector to search for a better opportunity. In the third stage, as a result
of job search and vacancy creation, matches are formed. In the fourth and final stage, the
matched firms and workers produce, while unmatched workers remain unemployed.
The cost of creating a vacancy is k. The cost of moving between two sectors can differ
across workers. For tractability purposes, we impose the condition that some workers have
a prohibitive moving cost, while the rest of the workers can move costlessly between sectors.
Workers who have prohibitive moving costs are referred to as immobile workers, while those
who have zero moving costs are referred to as mobile workers. Let µ denote the share of
mobile workers.
2.2 Production
Consider a matched firm whose employee’s productivity is x. Depending on whether the
firm operates in sector 0 or sector 1, its output is given by
y0(x) = z0(1− x)E−φ0 (1)
or
y1(x) = z1(1 + x)E
−φ
1 , (2)
where 0 < φ < 1, and E0 and E1 are employment in sector 0 and 1, respectively. This pro-
duction function reflects key elements of the model. First, as in standard sectoral reallocation
theory (e.g., Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Rogerson (1987)), the marginal productivity of
labor is decreasing at the sectoral level.4
Second, as in Moscarini and Vella (2008), the idiosyncratic productivity shock x is purely
sector-specific in the sense that a worker who is more productive in a particular sector is
less productive in the other sector. The idiosyncratic productivity shock x is drawn from a
4Also, see Coen-Pirani (2010) and Rogerson, Visschers and Wright (2009).
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symmetric distribution G on the interval [−σ, σ]. For example, consider a worker in sector 1
who has just observed his idiosyncratic productivity shock, x. If x is much lower than zero,
moving to sector 0 may greatly improve his productivity. Conversely, if the idiosyncratic
shock of a worker in sector 0 is much higher than zero, that worker may become more
productive by moving to sector 1.
2.3 Matching technology
Let u˜j(x) denote the number of workers searching for a job at productivity level x in sector j.
Similarly, let vj(x) denote the number of firms looking for a worker at the same productivity
level in the same sector. Consistent with Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), the number of
matches formed between these workers and firms is given by
N(vj(x), u˜j(x)) = A(vj(x))
θ(u˜j(x))
1−θ,
where A > 0 represents the efficiency of the matching technology, and θ > 0 represents its
elasticity. An unemployed worker searching for a job in sector j at productivity level x finds
a job with probability f(qj(x)) = A (qj(x))
−θ, where qj(x) = u˜j(x)/vj(x) is the queue length.
Similarly, one of the vj(x) vacancies is filled with probability α(qj(x)) = A (qj(x))
1−θ.
2.4 Value functions
A worker who did not find a job receives income b, which may consist of the imputed value
of leisure as well as unemployment insurance payments. Unemployment income b is lower
than a firm’s output: b < yj(x) for all j and x.
5 For employed workers, wages are determined
through competitive search as postulated in Moen (1997). In particular, as in Rogerson et al.
(2005), firms post wages to maximize their expected profit and workers direct their search to
the most attractive firms within the sector. Let wj(x) denote the wage posted at productivity
level x in sector j.
Let Sj(x) denote the utility value of searching for a job in sector j to a worker with
idiosyncratic productivity shock x, and let M1−j(x) denote the utility value of moving to
sector 1− j for the same worker. Then,
Sj(x) = b+ f(qj(x))(wj(x)− b) (3)
5In our analysis, we consider ex-ante identical workers and assume that unemployment income b is the
same among workers with different productivity shocks. One can allow b to increase with the idiosyncratic
productivity shock x to reflect the possibility that more productive workers value leisure more. However,
using the results below in Proposition 2, one can see that such a variation in income b is inconsequential for
the results, as long as the job-finding rate increases with productivity (see equation (35)).
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and
M1−j(x) = b− c+ f(q1−j(x))(w1−j(x)− b), (4)
where c denotes moving cost. As stated earlier, c is zero for mobile workers and infinitely
large for immobile workers.
From the perspective of a firm, the utility value of creating a job vacancy at the produc-
tivity level x in sector j is denoted Vj(x). Then,
Vj(x) = max
wj(x)
{−k + α(qj(x))(yj(x)− wj(x))} . (5)
Firms post vacancies to satisfy equation (5), while workers direct their search to the most
attractive offers. In other words, equation (3) is taken as a constraint for solving equation (5).
All rents from vacancy creation are exhausted: for each pair (j, x),
Vj(x) = 0. (6)
2.5 Equilibrium
Solving for a labor market equilibrium of a sector amounts to finding the wage and queue
length at each productivity level x in that sector.
2.5.1 Wages
Combining equations (5) and (6) yields:
k
α(qj(x))
= yj(x)− wj(x). (7)




subject to equation (3). Then, as in Rogerson et al. (2005), one can obtain
α′(qj(x))(yj(x)− b) = f(qj(x))(wj(x)− b). (9)
Combining this with equations (1) and (2), wages can be rewritten as
w0(x) = θb+ (1− θ)(1− x)z0E−φ0 (10)
5
and
w1(x) = θb+ (1− θ)(1 + x)z1E−φ1 . (11)
Remark 1 (Uniqueness). Within each sector, the wage wj(x) is unique for the idiosyncratic
productivity shock, x.
Remark 2 (Wage profile). Within each sector, the wage wj(x) grows with productivity
yj(x).
2.5.2 Queue length
Using the free-entry condition in equation (7) and the wages in equations (10) and (11), it






















where 0 < θ < 1 and qj(x) > 0 for all j and x. Equations (12) and (13) imply that the queue
length qj(x) is unique for x and decreases with productivity yj(x) for each j (see Figure 3).
Using these results, the following claim can be made:
Remark 3 (Job-finding rate and productivity). The job-finding rate f(qj(x)) increases
with productivity yj(x) for each j.
So, both the wage and the job-finding rate increase with productivity. Specifically, in
sector 1 (in sector 0), individuals with higher (lower) x have a larger wage and a higher
job-finding rate.
2.5.3 Mobility and the labor force
Given a nonzero dispersion of the idiosyncratic productivity (i.e., when σ > 0), for mobile
workers, there should exist an indifference productivity level x∗j ∈ (−σ, σ) such that, for






Then, a mobile worker of sector 1 will move to sector 0 if the person’s idiosyncratic shock
is below x∗1. Similarly, a mobile worker of sector 0 will move to sector 1 if the shock of that
worker is above x∗0.
Let Ψj denote the decision rule governing whether a mobile worker in sector j stays in
the current sector: Ψ1(x) takes on the value 1 if x ≥ x∗1 and 0 otherwise, while Ψ0(x) takes
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on the value 1 if x ≤ x∗0 and 0 otherwise. Then, once workers are reallocated, the labor force
of sector j ∈ {0, 1} becomes







Notice that wages, queue lengths and mobility decisions are obtained for a given level of
employment. Therefore, in order to characterize the equilibrium, it is necessary to determine
how employment in each sector is related to mobility and queue length. Using the decision












The economy-wide unemployment rate is
u = 1− E1 + E2
2
. (17)
Let m˜j(x) denote the measure of mobile workers looking for a job in sector j at productivity
level x: m˜j(x) = (1 + Ψj(x) − Ψ1−j(x))µ/(2σ). The unemployment rates of mobile and
immobile workers are, respectively,




(m˜0(x)f0(x) + m˜1(x)f1(x)) dx (18)
and




(f0(x) + f1(x)) dG(x). (19)
Using these results, it can be seen that the share of mobile versus immobile workers plays an
important role in labor market equilibrium. More important, in light of equations (12), (13)
and (16), labor mobility affects the job-finding rate of both mobile and immobile workers.
For the remainder of the paper, we analyze the impact of µ on the labor market outcomes of
mobile and immobile workers. In doing so, we consider two distinct versions of the model in
the next two sections. In Section 3, we consider the special case of the model in which labor
mobility is in one direction only. This special case is referred to as the net mobility model.
Then, in Section 4, we consider a version of the model in which a sector can experience
simultaneous and equal in- and out-migration, without any change in the sectoral labor
force. With a slight abuse of language, this version of the model is referred to as the gross
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mobility model. These two versions of the model are complementary in the sense that labor
flows occurring at the sectoral level can be decomposed into net mobility and flows that fully
cancel out at the sectoral level.
3 Net mobility effects
Here agents in the same sector do not differ by their productivity. In particular, we consider
the case in which σ = 0 and thus, for each j, a firm’s output is simplified to yj(x) = zjE
−φ
j .
Clearly, when z0 = z1, no worker will move. However, if sector-specific shocks (hereinafter
sector shock) differ, some mobile workers from the sector with the worse shock will move to
the one with the better shock in order to obtain a gain in productivity while generating net
mobility. In this section, we now assume that z0 < z1. Let m denote the number of people
moving from sector 0 to sector 1. Then,{
L0 = 1−m
L1 = 1 +m.
(20)
Let pj denote the probability of finding a job in sector j. Using the queue lengths in








j = Dzj, (21)
where a = θ






> 0. Equations (20) and (21) determine the
relationship between net mobility and unemployment and thus will be the main focus of this
section.
3.1 Only immobile workers
Before we analyze the impact of mobility, let us consider the extreme case in which all
workers are immobile. Let pmin and pmax denote the job-finding probability in sectors 0 and
1, respectively, when Lj = 1 for each j. Equation (21) shows that when z0 < z1, the job-
finding probability and employment are higher in sector 1: pmin < pmax. It is useful to keep
this in mind for the analysis below.
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3.2 Only mobile workers
Consider the case where all workers are mobile. As some workers leave sector 0, per-worker
output will increase in that sector while raising the job-finding rate, p0. Specifically, using





1 + pφ+ 1aj Lφj
aφDzj
−1 . (22)
This equation shows that
dpj
dLj
< 0, implying that a decrease in a sector’s labor force raises
the job-finding rate in that sector. For the same reason, per-worker output of sector 1 will
decrease as workers migrate there. Migration will continue until per-worker output is the






Since all workers are mobile, it is straightforward to characterize the queue lengths and








j − b), (24)
where qj(0) > 0 and 0 < θ < 1. This implies that when (23) holds, q0(0) = q1(0). Therefore,
at equilibrium, the job-finding rate is the same across sectors. Let pF denote the job-finding
probability when there is full arbitrage. Using equations (21) and (22), it can be seen that
pmin < pF < pmax. (25)
The employment levels of sectors 0 and 1 are E0 = (1−mF )pF and E1 = (1+mF )pF , where
mF is the level of net mobility needed to achieve full arbitrage. Equation (23) implies that















This net flow levels the playing field by allowing the higher productivity of sector 1 to be
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shared between the sectors.6
3.3 Mobile and immobile workers
We now analyze the case in which there are both mobile and immobile workers. The above
results suggest that the relevant range for the fraction of mobile workers is [0,mF ]. In
this range, net mobility is given by m = min{µ,mF}. As stated before, this mobility puts
upward pressure on the unemployment rate in sector 1 while reducing the unemployment
rate of those who are in sector 0.
3.3.1 Aggregate employment
Whether the share of mobile versus immobile workers raises or lowers economy-wide employ-
ment is not obvious. We address this issue in the following statement.
Proposition 1. In the net mobility model, an increase in the fraction of mobile workers
raises (lowers) economy-wide employment (unemployment).







j (zj − bEφj ) (27)
for each j. Then, using the implicit function theorem, it can be seen that when 1 −mF <














The right-hand side of equation (28) is positive. Therefore, the number of employed workers
in a sector is positively related to its labor force:
dEj
dLj
> 0. Since L0 = 1−m and L1 = 1+m,
equation (28) implies that the impact of the fraction of mobile workers in the absence of full
























for all µ ∈ {0,mF}. On the other hand, equation (21) implies that p0 < pF < p1. and thus
the right-hand side of equation (29) is positive. So, the fraction of mobile workers, µ, raises
6In fact, using state-level data, Blanchard and Katz (1992) show that net mobility reduces the impact of
an adverse labor demand shock on local unemployment.
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economy-wide employment, E0 + E1, and, therefore, lowers aggregate unemployment.
Now we analyze how the share of mobile workers affects the unemployment rate among
mobile and immobile workers.
3.3.2 Unemployment of mobile and immobile workers
Let u0(µ) and u∞(µ) denote the unemployment rate of mobile and immobile workers when
the fraction of mobile workers is µ. First we consider the unemployment rate of mobile
workers. For this purpose, we point out that when 0 ≤ µ ≤ mF , all mobile workers will be
in sector 1. Since the unemployment rate of sector 1 increases with µ, one can make the
following claim:
Corollary 1. In the net mobility model, the share of mobile workers raises their unemploy-
ment rate: du0(µ)
dµ
> 0 when 0 ≤ µ < mF .
The unemployment rate of immobile workers is given by 1− (p0 + p1)/2 and the proba-
bilities p0 and p1 move in the opposite direction as the fraction of mobile workers changes.
Therefore, analyzing the impact of net mobility on the unemployment rate of immobile
workers amounts to comparing the opposite effects of p0 and p1.
Corollary 2. Under full arbitrage, labor mobility lowers the unemployment rate among
immobile workers - that is to say u∞(0) > u∞(mF ).
Proof. When µ = 0, the labor force of each sector is 1 and therefore, the average job-finding
rate of immobile workers is equal to that of an average worker in the economy. Now let
µ = mF . Since there is full arbitrage, all workers in the economy share the same job-finding
rate. On the other hand, Proposition 1 shows that the overall job-finding rate increases with
mobility. Therefore, the average job-finding rate among immobile workers increases when
the fraction of mobile workers increases from zero to mF .
Corollary 2 states that the unemployment rate of immobile workers is a globally decreasing
function of the fraction of mobile workers. Next we show that a marginal increase in the
share of mobile workers can have a non-monotonic impact on the unemployment rate of
immobile workers. Specifically, we show that, for plausible parameter values, u∞(µ) can be
a U-shaped, but globally increasing, function.
















1 = K. (30)
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Thus, when the economy is at full arbitrage, a marginal decrease in the fraction of mobile
workers lowers the job-finding rate of immobile workers. Equivalently, as the fraction of
mobile workers approaches the level of mobility needed to achieve full arbitrage, an increase
in the fraction of mobile workers lowers the unemployment rate of immobile workers.
However, inequality (32) may not always hold for all µ ∈ {0,mF}, meaning that a
marginal increase in the share of mobile workers may raise the unemployment rate of im-
mobile workers. Specifically, using equation (31), it can be seen that when the fraction of
mobile workers is much lower than mF or, equivalently, when the gap between `0 and `1
is large, the inequality may not hold. To see the point, consider the case where the gap
between `0 and `1 is largest, which is when the fraction of mobile workers, µ, is initially zero
and thus Lj = 1 for each j. Let Rj denote the absolute value of
dpj
dLj
when Lj = 1:





1 + pφ+ 1aj
aφDzj
−1 .













where γ = p
φ+1/a
j /(Dzj). It can be seen that 1−γ is the replacement ratio and thus 0 < γ ≤ 1.
Moreover, we have 0 < φ < 1, a = θ/(1 − θ) > 0 and zj > 0 for each j. Therefore, the
right-hand side of equation (34) can be positive. This means that when the fraction of mobile
workers is very low, mobility can have a greater impact on the job-finding rate of a sector
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with a higher technology shock. Therefore, a marginal increase in the fraction of mobile




is not always positive. For example, when the elasticity of the matching function,
θ, is sufficiently low (thus a is small), the right-hand side of equation (34) is negative. Under
such circumstances, the unemployment rate of immobile workers will be a strictly decreasing
function of the share of mobile workers. For the remainder of the section, we illustrate these
points numerically.
3.4 Numerical example
We start with a benchmark model with the following features: a) no immobile workers, µ = 1;
b) symmetric sector shocks, z0 = z1 = 1; c) unit queue lengths at x = 0, q0(0) = q1(0) = 1;
and d) a job-finding rate of 0.45 at x = 0 for each j. The parameter values associated with
this calibration are presented in Table 1. Consider the case where z0 = 1 and z1 = 1.8. Using
equation (26), the share of mobile workers needed to achieve full arbitrage is mF = 0.626
(62.6%). Thus, the relevant range for the share of mobile workers is [0, 0.626].
Figure 1 displays aggregate unemployment and the unemployment rates of mobile and
immobile workers as a function of the share of mobile workers. It shows that a higher share of
mobile workers is associated with lower aggregate unemployment. The figure also illustrates
that weaker arbitrage has a positive effect on the workers who find themselves in the more
productive sector. Thus, sector 1 workers and mobile workers have lower unemployment
rates as µ decreases. Consistent with the analytical results, the share of mobile workers has
a non-monotonic impact on the unemployment rate of immobile workers. Figure 2 shows
that when the elasticity of the matching function, θ, is sufficiently low, the unemployment
rate of immobile workers is a strictly decreasing function of the share of mobile workers.
Finally, both Figures 1 and 2 show that the unemployment rate of immobile workers is a
globally decreasing function of the share of mobile workers: u∞(0) > u∞(0.626) for both
cases.
4 Gross mobility effects
Here the technology shock of each sector is normalized to 1 (i.e., z0 = z1 = 1), while workers
can differ by their idiosyncratic productivity shock (i.e., σ > 0). Our analysis in this section
focuses mainly on sector 1. Since the two sectors are symmetric with respect to x, the results
for sector 0 can be obtained analogously.
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4.1 Sectoral employment
Since mobility is driven by the idiosyncratic shock, for each mobile worker in sector 0 willing
to relocate, there will be another mobile worker in sector 1 also willing to relocate. Thus, in
this version of the model, labor mobility has no impact on the size of the labor force of each
sector. However, it affects the overall productivity of workers within each sector. Specifically,
since, on average, in-migrants are more productive than incumbent workers, an increase in
the share of mobile workers will raise the relative share of more productive workers within
each sector. This shift in the within-sector wage distribution, in turn, affects employment.
Proposition 2. In the gross mobility model, the share of mobile (immobile) workers raises
(lowers) employment in both sectors.









where, as before, D > 0 and a > 0. Let Hj(x|µ) denote the productivity distribution of
workers of sector j over the shock x after workers relocate when the share of mobile workers









Consider the following function:


















is positive (see equation (37)). On the other hand, when the fraction of
mobile workers, µ, increases, overall productivity in the sector increases. Since the proba-
bility of finding a job increases with productivity (see equation (35)), the right-hand side
of equation (36) increases for a given level of sectoral employment, implying that ∂Γ(E1,µ)
∂µ
is





Consequently, aggregate employment also increases with the share of mobile workers.
This increase is due to the increased fluidity of the labor force. When the labor market
is increasingly mobile, there is more reallocation of the labor force. Therefore, a lower
fraction of workers will be stuck in jobs in which they are far less productive than they
would otherwise be in the other sector of the economy. So, as the share of mobile workers
increases, the overall sectoral match quality goes up while lowering aggregate unemployment.
4.2 Unemployment of mobile and immobile workers
As before, let u0(µ) and u∞(µ) denote the unemployment rate of mobile and immobile
workers when the fraction of mobile workers is µ.
Corollary 3. In the gross mobility model, the share of mobile workers raises the unemploy-
ment rate of both mobile and immobile workers: du0(µ)
dµ
> 0 and du∞(µ)
dµ
> 0 for all µ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Since the distribution of immobile workers over the productivity shock x does not
change, their job-finding rate is determined by sectoral employment (see equation (35)).
Since the share of mobile workers raises sectoral employment (see Proposition 2), it will
increase the unemployment rate of immobile workers. The distribution (not the size) of
mobile workers over the productivity shock x also remains unaffected when the share of
mobile versus immobile workers shifts. Therefore, their job-finding rate also decreases with
the fraction of mobile workers.
These results may seem inconsistent with Proposition 2. Specifically, the proposition
states that the aggregate unemployment rate goes down with the fraction of mobile workers,
while Corollary 3 say that the unemployment rates of the two groups increase as the fraction
increases. The reason for this seemingly opposite prediction is that the unemployment rate
is higher for immobile workers. To see this, consider the following decomposition:
u(µ) = µu0(µ) + (1− µ)u∞(µ),
where u(µ) is the aggregate unemployment rate when the fraction of mobile workers is µ.
Differentiating the equation with respect to µ, one can obtain
u′(µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
negative
= [u0(µ)− u∞(µ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
negative




This equation, along with Proposition 2 and Corollary 3, shows that the level effect, u0(µ)−
u∞(µ), dominates the effect resulting from changes in the unemployment rates of the two
groups, µu′0(µ) + (1− µ)u′∞(µ). So, the share of mobile workers lowers the aggregate unem-
ployment rate while raising the unemployment rates of mobile and immobile workers.
4.3 Numerical example
To illustrate these effects numerically, the model is recalibrated. The new calibration targets
are similar to those in the net mobility model, but this time it reflects the productivity
dispersion. We set the productivity dispersion parameter σ to 0.2, implying that, depending
on the share of mobile workers, the variation of productivity is 6-12%. The parameters are
summarized in the third column of Table 1.




2.5(1− µ) if −0.2 ≤ x < 0
2.5(1 + µ) if 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.2.
So, overall productivity increases with µ, the share of mobile workers. The queue length is
graphed in Figure 3. Consistent with equations (12) and (13), the queue length increases
with productivity yj(x). More important, given the shock x, the queue length increases as the
fraction of mobile workers increases. The unemployment rates of sub-groups are presented in
Figure 4. They show that as the fraction of mobile workers increases, the unemployment rate
of both mobile and immobile workers increases, while aggregate unemployment decreases,
which is consistent with equation (38).
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple equilibrium model of sectoral reallocation with hetero-
geneous moving costs in which there can be simultaneous in- and outflows at the sectoral
level. In the model, labor mobility is influenced by a sectoral level shock and an idiosyncratic
shock specific to the sector-worker match. According to the model, aggregate unemployment
and the share of mobile workers are negatively related. More important, the model reveals
that the interaction between mobile and immobile workers can be different depending on
how mobility is modeled. When labor mobility is driven by an idiosyncratic sector-worker
match effect, the share of mobile workers raises the unemployment rate of immobile workers.
However, when labor mobility is driven by a sectoral level aggregate disturbance, mobile
workers can have a non-monotonic, but globally negative impact on the unemployment rate
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of immobile workers. These results suggest that focusing only on aggregate and sector-level
variables might introduce an important oversight regarding the underlying economic mech-
anism through which workers interact across sectors. Therefore, the micro-level relationship
between mobility and wages might be key to understanding unemployment in a multi-sector
economy.
Clearly, the model considered in this paper is too simple to pinpoint conditions under
which the gross mobility effect dominates the net mobility effect, or vice-versa. Therefore,
an interesting exercise would measure these effects while allowing for a more realistic setting
in a particular context, such as the interaction between the labor market and homeowner-
ship. Moreover, a multi-period dimension can be added to introduce persistence for both
idiosyncratic and sector-wide shocks. This will help quantify the relative magnitude of these
two shocks using micro data on labor income. Also, one may need to take into account
life-cycle effects by considering different moving costs for young and old workers. Future
research should look at these important directions. Nevertheless, the current study can be
viewed as an important step toward understanding how the variability of labor mobility
affects unemployment.
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Table 1: Parameter Values for Numerical Examples
net gross
parameter mobility mobility description
model model
A 0.450 same efficiency of the matching technology
θ 0.500 same elasticity of the matching technology
φ 0.400 same elasticity of labor productivity to sectoral employment
b 0.630 same unemployment benefits
k 0.168 0.146 vacancy posting cost
σ 0 0.200 dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity
Notes: The value θ = 0.5 is consistent with Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The pa-
rameter k is chosen to normalize the queue lengths q0(0) and q1(0) to unity. Given this
normalization, the value of A measures the job-finding rate, which is set to 0.45. The value
b = 0.63 implies that in the benchmark model, the replacement ratio is 0.46, which is in the
range of estimates found in Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007). The value of φ implies that the
elasticity of aggregate output to employment is 0.6 (=1-0.4).
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Figure 1: Unemployment in Net Mobility Model: Benchmark, θ = 0.5















































Notes: This figure shows how unemployment responds to the share of mobile workers, µ,
in the net mobility model when θ = 0.5 and z1 = 1.8, while the other parameters are at
their benchmark values. The upper panel shows aggregate unemployment u. The middle
panel shows the unemployment rate of mobile workers, u0(µ), while the lower panel shows
the unemployment rate of immobile workers u∞(µ). See Table 1 for the parameter values
used for the diagram.
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Figure 2: Unemployment in Net Mobility Model: θ = 0.1

















































Notes: This figure shows how unemployment responds to the share of mobile workers, µ, in
the net mobility model when θ = 0.1 and z1 = 1.8, while the other parameters are at their
benchmark values. The lower panel shows that when the elasticity of the matching function,
θ, is sufficiently low, the unemployment rate of immobile workers is a strictly decreasing
function of the share of mobile workers.
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Figure 3: Queue Length in Gross Mobility Model























Notes: This figure shows that the queue length in sector 1 decreases with productivity and
that the share of mobile workers, µ, raises the queue length at each productivity level. (The
queue length in sector 0 is a mirror reflection of the curves across the vertical line x = 0.)
See Section 4.3 for numerical details.
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Figure 4: Unemployment in Gross Mobility Model














































Notes: This figure illustrates the impact of the share of mobile workers on unemployment
in the gross mobility model considered in Section 4. The upper panel shows aggregate
unemployment, while the middle and lower panels display the unemployment rate of mobile
and immobile workers, respectively. See Section 4.3 for numerical details.
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